Eagle Insurance Co. v. Butts
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
269 A.D.2d 558, 707 N.Y.S.2d 115
February 28, 2000
Summary of Opinion
Ms. Butts was injured while unloading a horse owned by Ms. Vanderveer from a
van owned by Ms. Vanderveer. She sued. Ms. Vanderveer had two insurance
policies: one on her horse and one on her vehicle. This case is about which
insurance company has the obligation to defend the lawsuit and pay any insured
judgment.
The trial court said that the accident was not covered under the automobile
insurance policy and the Appellate Division agreed. It said that it is not
sufficient that the accident occurred while unloading the horse from the van.
There must be in addition some act of negligence in the use of the vehicle—here
the process of unloading--which is claimed to have caused the accident to occur.
In this case, Ms. Butts claimed that Ms. Vanderveer’s prior negligent training
of the horse caused the accident. That places the accident outside of coverage
of the automobile policy.
Text of Opinion
In an action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiff is not
required to defend and indemnify the defendant Loretta Vanderveer in an action
entitled Butts v Vanderveer, pending in the Supreme Court, Dutchess County,
under Index No.1996/2748, the defendant General Star Indemnity Company appeals
from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (LaCava,
J.), dated February 23, 1999, which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, denied its cross motion for summary judgment, and declared that the
plaintiff had no obligation to defend or indemnify Loretta Vanderveer in the
underlying action.
ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff in the underlying personal injury action, Anne B. Butts, was
injured as she was leading a horse from a van down an attached ramp. The horse
and van were both owned by Loretta Vanderveer. The horse jumped while on the
ramp, throwing Butts to the ground. Butts alleged in her complaint that the
accident was caused by Vanderveer's negligent training of the horse.
Vanderveer was insured by an automobile policy issued by Eagle Insurance
Company (hereinafter Eagle), which covered the subject van. General Star
Indemnity Company (hereinafter General Star) issued a general liability
insurance policy which provided Vanderveer with coverage for injuries resulting
from the use and ownership of her horse. General Star defended Vanderveer in the
underlying action and subsequently requested that Eagle assume the defense.
Eagle disclaimed coverage on the ground that Butts' claim did not result from
the "ownership, maintenance or use" of a covered vehicle. In the instant action,
the Supreme Court upheld the disclaimer and declared that Eagle was not required
to defend or indemnify Vanderveer. We now affirm.
For purposes of this appeal, Eagle concedes that the term "use" in the policy
encompassed the activity of loading and unloading the subject van. Generally,
the determination of whether an accident has resulted from the use or operation
of a covered vehicle requires consideration of whether, inter alia, the accident
arose out of the inherent nature of the vehicle and whether the vehicle itself
produced the injury (see, U.S. Oil Ref. & Mktg. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
181 A.D.2d 768, 581 N.Y.S.2d 822), or, in other words, whether the use of the
vehicle was a proximate cause of the injury (see, Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 145 A.D.2d 314, 534 N.Y.S.2d 982; Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Logan, 88 A.D.2d 971, 451 N.Y.S.2d 804).
We agree with General Star that where the accident occurs during the loading
or unloading of property from a covered vehicle, the test as to whether coverage
is triggered under the subject provision of the policy is more flexible and does
not require a showing that the vehicle itself produced the injury (see, e.g.,
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 103 A.D.2d 60, 477
N.Y.S.2d 657, affd. 64 N.Y.2d 1049, 489 N.Y.S.2d 704, 478 N.E.2d 1305; Matter of
Duncan Petroleum Transp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 96 A.D.2d 942, 466 N.Y.S.2d 394,
affd. 61 N.Y.2d 665, 472 N.Y.S.2d 88, 460 N.E.2d 229; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 91 A.D.2d 317, 459 N.Y.S.2d 158; Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 18 A.D.2d 460, 240 N.Y.S.2d 88; cf., Walton v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 211, 644 N.Y.S.2d 133, 666 N.E.2d 1046).
Nevertheless, it is insufficient to show merely that the accident occurred
during the period of loading or unloading. Rather, the accident must be the
result of some act or omission related to the use of the vehicle (cf., Argentina
v. Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 554, 693 N.Y.S.2d 493, 715 N.E.2d
495).
In the case at bar, Vanderveer's alleged acts or omissions involved her prior
training of the horse, which allegedly made it prone to jump while on the ramp.
There were no allegations that Vanderveer used the van negligently or that the
condition of the van in any way contributed to the accident. Under the
circumstances, we agree with the Supreme Court that Eagle was not required to
defend or indemnify Vanderveer in the underlying action.
|
